City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C.: Are We Losing the First Amendment, or Just Adult Businesses by Cynn, Karen
Volume 12 Issue 2 Article 2 
2005 
City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C.: Are We Losing the First 
Amendment, or Just Adult Businesses 
Karen Cynn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Karen Cynn, City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C.: Are We Losing the First Amendment, or Just Adult 
Businesses, 12 Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports L.J. 227 (2005). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol12/iss2/2 
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
Casenotes
CITY OF LITTLETON V. Z.J. GIFTS D-4, L.L. C. : ARE WE
LOSING THE FIRST AMENDMENT, OR JUST
ADULT BUSINESSES?
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly twenty years ago, the Supreme Court ruled that adult
businesses and sexually oriented materials were entitled to some,
but not full, First Amendment protection. 2 Since then, courts have
tried to determine the boundaries of this lesser protection.3 For
years, circuit courts were split over whether ordinances governing
adult businesses were required to provide a prompt judicial deci-
sion, or access to prompt judicial review in the event an adult busi-
ness license application was denied.4 In City of Littleton, Colorado v.
Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C.,5 the Supreme Court finally helped clarify the
limits of the constitutional protection given to the adult entertain-
ment industry.6 Specifically, the Court held adult businesses are en-
1. 124 S. Ct. 2219 (2004).
2. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (holding
erotic nonobscene material was protected, but to lesser degree than other forms of
speech). For a further discussion of the First Amendment protection of adult busi-
nesses, see infra notes 43-89 and accompanying text.
3. See George Merritt, Littleton case may decide fate of adult-store licensing, DENVER
POST, Oct. 15, 2003, at A20 (recognizing thirteen year dispute over one aspect of
level of protection adult businesses should receive); see alsoJulie Hilden, Does The
Guarantee of a "Prompt" Judicial Decision Apply to Adult Business Zoning Cases?, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20040203.html (Feb. 3, 2004) (discussing
ambiguities in defining scope of protection adult businesses are entitled to under
First Amendment). According to Hilden, even if it were established that adult
businesses receive a prompt judicial decision "on whether they'd complied with
obscenity censorship law[,] . . . did that also mean that adult businesses were enti-
tled to a promptjudicial decision on whether they had complied with zoning law?"
Id. For further discussion of the debate, see infra notes 63-89 and accompanying
text.
4. See Hilden, supra note 3 (explaining distinction is significant because while
decision is pending, speakers may be silenced until final decision is made). A
prompt judicial decision would ensure that a speedy determination was available.
See id. Access to prompt judicial review, however, requires only "an 'avenue' for
review, as opposed to the need for a final judicial decision." Id. For detailed dis-
cussion of the circuit split, see infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
5. 124 S. Ct. 2219 (2004).
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titled to a prompt judicial decision. 7 It also found that the ordinary
state judicial review rules at work in the case were sufficient to en-
sure constitutionality.8
The First Amendment guarantees, among other things, the
freedom of speech. 9 While freedom of speech is one of the most
fundamental rights Americans enjoy, there are limits to what is con-
sidered protected expression.' 0 Z.J Gifts, like every case that impli-
cates the First Amendment, was essential because it had the
potential to change the culture of our democratic society." These
are the cases where the Court is given the power to restrict or grant
First Amendment freedoms, an essential basis of our society.1 2
Jurisprudential history indicates that the First Amendment was
largely defined before 1950, indeed, recent trends show a decline
in the number of free speech cases the Supreme Court has agreed
to hear. 13 Maintaining the adult business industry as a form of pro-
7. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2224 (holding adult business licensing schemes
were required to provide prompt judicial decision).
8. See id. at 2224-26 (indicating normal state judicial review procedures are
adequate as long as courts remain sensitive to potential First Amendment wrongs).
For detailed discussion of the four reasons why ordinary state rules are sufficient,
see infra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (dealing with religious and political freedom). It
reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
10. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1964) (stating there is
"a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"). In the context of sexually ori-
ented material, obscenity is not protected. See id. For a full discussion of the First
Amendment, its importance, and its limits, see infra notes 43-46.
11. See Rodney Smolla, Speech - Overview, at http://www.firstamendment
center.org/speech/overview.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2005) (noting "direct link[exists] between freedom of speech and vibrant democracy" because "[f]ree
speech is an indispensable tool of self-governance in a democratic society"). Ac-
cording to Smolla, the promotion of democracy is not the only reason the First
Amendment is so important. See id. The First Amendment also promotes individu-
ality and shapes the way Americans think, thereby defining our "humanity." See id.
For a further discussion of the link between the First Amendment and democracy,
see infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
12. See Smolla, supra note 11 (stating "[t ] he First Amendment serves not only
the needs of the polity but also those of the human spirit - a spirit that demands
self-expression") (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974)); see also
Hilden, supra note 3 (contending if Court does not give adult businesses same
treatment as other First Amendment protected businesses, adult business causing
controversy in Littleton, Colorado will most likely have to move its location and
speech will become "less free").
13. See Ronald K.L. Collins, Recent trends go against free speech, at http://
www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=13985 (Sept. 4, 2004) (stating
2003-04 term, with exception of 1997-98 term, had fewest number of First Amend-
ment claims in over forty years).
[Vol. 12: p. 227
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tected expression is particularly controversial because it invokes
strong moral, religious, and First Amendment responses.1 4 Further
controversy surrounds Z.J Gifts because it is one of only three free-
dom of expression cases the Court chose to hear this past term.
15
Given the infrequency of First Amendment cases that make it to the
Supreme Court, Z.J Gifts has generated a substantial amount of at-
tention from both the public at large and the legal world.
16
This Note discusses the role adult businesses play in the devel-
opment of First Amendment law and how Z.J Gifts fits into that
evolution.1 7 The Note analyzes the implications of this case from
three angles. First, it discusses whether Z.J Gifts is just another in-
stance of First Amendment protections being reduced and the po-
tential impact if this contention were true.' 8 Second, it presents
14. The following organizations wrote amici curiae briefs in support of the
Respondent in .J. Gifts- the First Amendment Lawyers Association, the American
Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression, Association of American Publishers,
Inc., Comic Book Legal Defense Fund, Freedom to Read Foundation, Interna-
tional Periodical Distributors Association, Publishers Marketing Association, and
Video Software Dealers Association. See City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C.,
124 S. Ct. 2219 (2004) (listing organizations writing briefs). The First Amendment
Lawyers Association wrote one brief. See Brief of Amicus Curiae First Amendment
Lawyers Association at 1, City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 124 S. Ct. 2219
(2004) (No. 02-1609). The other organizations joined together to write the sec-
ond brief. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Booksellers Foundation for Free
Expression et al. at 1, City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 124 S. Ct. 2219
(2004) (No. 02-1609). For more detail on the subject of these briefs, see infta note
86 and accompanying text.
The following organizations wrote amici curiae briefs on behalf of the Peti-
tioner: The National League of Cities, International Municipal Lawyers Associa-
tion, International City/County Management Association, National Conference of
State Legislatures, National Association of Counties, U.S. Conference of Mayors,
the American Planning Association, Ohio, fourteen other states, and the Commu-
nity Defense Council. See Brief of Amici Curiae National League of Cities et al. at
1-2, City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 124 S. Ct. 2219 (2004) (No. 02-1609);
Brief of Amici Curiae Ohio et al. at 1, City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 124
S. Ct. 2219 (2004) (No. 02-1609); Brief of Amicus Curiae Community Defense
Counsel at 1, City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 124 S. Ct. 2219 (2004) (No.
02-1609). For a detailed discussion of the amici curiae briefs on behalf of the
Petitioner, see infra note 86 and accompanying text.
15. See Collins, supra note 13 (discussing three cases Court has heard in past
term, including Z.J Gifts). For a discussion of the attention given to, and organiza-
tions interested in, the .J. Gifts decision, see infra notes 86-88 and accompanying
text.
16. For a list of some of the organizations that have gotten involved, see supra
note 14. For a detailed discussion of those organizations' arguments, see infra
notes 86-88.
17. See David L. Hudson Jr., Enforcing Morality: Court Again Tackles Adult Con-
tent Restrictions and the First Amendment, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2004, at 14 [hereinafter En-
forcing Morality] (quoting attorney Tom Goldstein stating adult businesses and
pornography are "a cutting-edge area of First Amendment law").
18. See Alan Maimon, Knox County officials, adult store square off, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.),June 15, 2004, at Al (quoting adult business attorney Louis Sirkin
2005]
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criticisms of the argument that Z.J Gifts exemplifies erosion of the
First Amendment protections. 19 Third, the Note addresses the im-




Littleton, a city in Colorado with a population of 33,661, was
concerned with maintaining certain values. 21 In 1993, in an effort
to preserve its community, Littleton passed an "adult business" ordi-
nance which required that adult businesses obtain licenses to oper-
ate. 22 In nineteen detailed sections, the ordinance governs almost
every aspect of an adult business in Littleton. 2 3 The provision rele-
who said "I think Americans better wake up and realize pieces of their liberties are
slowly being taken away"). For a full discussion of the decline of the First Amend-
ment and the negative impact that has followed, see infra notes 157-61 and accom-
panying text.
19. See City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 124 S. Ct. 2219, 2226 (2004)(holding First Amendment claimant does not deserve especially fast judicial deci-
sion because it does not rise to level of censorship, and Colorado's rules are suffi-
ciently flexible enough so judges may reach decisions quickly while using judicial
power to prevent substantial First Amendment harms). The argument is essen-
tially that the Court provided for a lesser constitutional protection for adult busi-
nesses. See id. For a further discussion of the argument, see infra notes 154-56 and
accompanying text.
20. For commentary on some of these effects such as increased litigation, po-
tential censorship, and decrease in number of adult businesses across the country,
see infra notes 149-77 and accompanying text.
21. See General History of Littleton, at http://www.littletongov.org/history/
genhist.asp (last visited Mar. 25, 2005) (describing history of Littleton); see alsoCommunity Development, at http://www.littletongov.org/communitydev/default.asp
(last visited Mar. 25, 2005) (stating that Community Development Department isgroup whose purpose is specifically to "ensure quality, viable development that
encourages a community-minded balance and promotes the values, goals, and wel-
fare of the city of Littleton").
22. See generally LITTLETON, COLO., Crr CODE § 3-14 (2004) (regulating adultbusiness industry in Littleton). Littleton amended its ordinance in 2001 after theDistrict Court for the District of Colorado's decision. See id. In the amendment,
the city clarified certain corporate disclosure requirements and changed the age
restrictions for adult businesses that do not provide live entertainment. See LIT-
TLETON, COLO., ORDINANCE 13 (2001) (codified as LrrrLETON, COLO., CITY CODE§ 3-14-2, -5, -8, -16 (2002)). These amendments were not relevant to ZJ or to the
case.
23. See LITrLETON, COLO., CITY CODE § 3-14 (2004) (listing specific require-
ments and restrictions on adult businesses in Littleton, Colorado). The followingis a list of Littleton's adult business Code Sections, under Title 3: Business Regula-
tions, Chapter 14: Adult Entertainment Establishments:
§ 3-14-1: Purpose
§ 3-14-2: Definitions
§ 3-14-3: Location Of Adult Businesses; Amortization
§ 3-14-4: License Required; Fee
§ 3-14-5: License Application
§ 3-14-6: Application Fee
[Vol. 12: p. 227
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vant to this case requires an "adult bookstore, adult novelty store, or
adult video store" to obtain an adult business license.
24 It restricts
the areas where such businesses may be located. 25 Additionally, the
ordinance lists criteria which may provide the basis for Littleton to
deny a license request.
26
In the fall of 1999, the company Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C. ("ZJ")
opened a store named "Christal's" in Littleton, Colorado.
27 The
location they selected was not zoned to accommodate adult busi-
nesses. 28 ZJ knew they would not be able to operate an adult busi-
ness at this site.29 ZJ sold adult books among other merchandise,
however, they claimed they were not planning to operate an adult
§ 3-14-7: Investigation
§ 3-14-8: Approval/Denial of License
§ 3-14-9: Term Of License
§ 3-14-10: License Renewal
§ 3-14-11: Suspension Or Revocation of License
§ 3-14-12: Display; Transferability; Change Of Ownership
§ 3-14-13: Manager; Change Of Manager
§ 3-14-14: Hours Of Operation
§ 3-14-15: Standards Of Conduct
§ 3-14-16: Age Restrictions
§ 3-14-17: Lighting Requirements
§ 3-14-18: Right Of Entry
§ 3-14-19: Exemptions, Generally
Id.
24. See id. § 3-14-4 (stating "[n]o person shall conduct an adult business with-
out first having obtained an annual adult business license").
25. See id. § 3-14-3 (making it unlawful to operate adult businesses in any loca-
tion in Littleton except as provided in Code). Section B states:
It shall be unlawful to operate or cause to be operated an adult business
within five hundred feet (500') of:
1. A church;
2. A school or childcare facility;
3. A public park (not including trails);
4. A massage parlor licensed under provision of the city code; or
5. A community correctional facility.
Id. § 3-14-3(B).
26. See id. § 3-14-5, -8, -17 (including errors and omissions in application, ap-
plicant status, and failure to meet certain lighting requirements); see also Z.J. Gifts
D-4, L.L.C. v. City of Littleton, 311 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2002) (explaining
purpose of Littleton's ordinance was to require all adult businesses in Littleton to
obtain licenses to operate in city borders and to restrict those businesses to specific
areas in Littleton).
27. See City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 124 S. Ct. 2219, 2222 (stating
ZJ opened store that sold "adult books" on South Broadway in Littleton).
28. See LITrLETON, COLO., CrrY CODE § 3-14-3 (2004) (addressing where adult
businesses may be located within city limits). For the language of the ordinance,
see supra note 25.
29. See Z.j Gifts, 311 F.3d at 1224 (revealing Littleton told property owners
their location was not zoned to accommodate adult businesses).
20051
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business.30 ZJ did not apply for an adult business license as re-
quired by the Littleton ordinance because only adult businesses re-
quired one.3 ' Facing this quandary, prior to Christal's opening, ZJ
brought a lawsuit claiming Littleton's ordinance was facially uncon-
stitutional.3 2 ZJ argued the ordinance was unconstitutional for sev-
eral reasons.33 The most salient was that it did not provide for a
prompt judicial decision if there was an administrative denial of a
license application. 34 According to ZJ, this failure violated the First
Amendment because the lack of expeditious decision making cre-
ated the risk of indefinitely stifling constitutionally protected
30. See id. (discussing while ZJ argued it was not planning on operating as
adult business, the district court found it qualified as one). The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that ZJ would most probably constitute an adult busi-
ness under Littleton's ordinance Section 3-14-2, because a "commercial establish-
ment falls into this category if, as judged by percentage of stock-in-trade, revenue,
or advertising, it is primarily devoted to ... the depiction or description of 'speci-
fied sexual activities' or 'specified anatomical areas,' regardless of whether the es-
tablishment has other business purposes." Id. at 1224-25.
31. See LrrrLETON, COLO., CITY CODE § 3-14-5 (A) (requiring all persons oper-
ating adult business to obtain annual adult business license first). This provision
states: "All applicants for an adult business license shall file an application for such
license with the city clerk on forms to be provided by the clerk. Each principal
owner and all managers and employees shall be named in the application form."
Id. Section 3-14-5 goes on to state other adult business application criteria, such as
what information is required to be provided on the application, what happens if
the information is wrong, omitted, or improperly completed, and the duty to con-
tinually update any information that may change. See id. §§ 3-14-5(B)-(F).
32. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2222 (indicating plaintiffs argued city ordinance
infringed on their First Amendment rights).
33. See Z.J Gifts, 311 F.3d at 1224 (seeking monetary, declaratory, and injunc-
tive relief against Littleton).
34. See id. at 1227; see also LrrLETON, COLO., CIrv CODE § 3-14-8(B) (describ-
ing procedures when finding license ineligible). The relevant portion of this sec-
tion of Littleton's Code states:
2. If the city manager determines that the applicant is ineligible for alicense per subsection (A) of this section, he/she shall issue an order
sustaining the city clerk's denial of the application, within two (2) days
after the hearing is concluded, based on findings of fact. A copy of the
order shall be mailed to the applicant at the address supplied on the
application.
3. The order of the city manager made pursuant to subsection (B)2 of
this section shall be a final decision and may be appealed to the dis-
trict court pursuant to Colorado rules of civil procedure 106(a)(4).
Failure of an applicant to timely follow the limits specified above con-
stitutes a waiver by him/her of any right he/she may otherwise have to
contest the denial of his/her license application.
Id. §§ 3-14-8(B) (2), (3); see also Z.J Gifts, 311 F.3d at 1224 (stating ZJ claimed Lit-
tleton's ordinance intruded on their rights making Littleton liable to them under
42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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speech. 35 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, in part, with
ZJ and held certain provisions of the statute unconstitutional.
3 6
The United States Supreme Court accepted this case to settle
the conflict surrounding adult business licensing schemes. 37 In par-
ticular, the Court examined whether a scheme was required to pro-
vide a prompt judicial decision or simply access to prompt judicial
review of an administrative decision denying a license in order to
comply with the First Amendment.38 The Supreme Court agreed
with the Tenth Circuit that a prompt judicial decision was required
under the First Amendment.39 Departing from the lower court, it
held that the existing rules in Colorado governing judicial review
were adequate to ensure the judicial decision would be prompt.40
Any inappropriate delays may be adjudicated on a case by case ba-
35. See Z.J Gifts, 311 F.3d at 1231 (stating "'a scheme that fails to set reasona-
ble time limits on the decisionmaker creates the risk of indefinitely suppressing
permissible speech'") (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 227
(1990)). The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted
summary judgment to Littleton. See id. at 1224. ZJ brought a facial challenge to
the ordinance on two grounds which passed standing requirements. See id. First,
the plaintiffs argued that the ordinance placed too much discretion in the deci-
sion-maker, and therefore, it was overbroad. See id. Second, they contended that
"the unbridled discretion includes licensing schemes that create a 'risk of delay'
.... I Id. at 1227 (quoting FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 223-24). This delay, the claimant
argued, "creates an impermissible risk of suppression of ideas." Id. The Tenth
Circuit agreed with ZJ that the pre-application requirements of the ordinance were
unconstitutional. See id. at 1241. However, it found ZJ lacked standing "to chal-
lenge the ordinance as vague, attack the ordinance's license revocation and sus-
pension provisions, or challenge the age and criminal history restrictions in the
ordinance." Id. The court of appeals reversed the decision of the district court
regarding the constitutionality of the ordinance, but affirmed the district court's
finding that Z.J. lacked standing to challenge the ordinance as vague. See id. at
1241.
36. See id. at 1238 (accepting ZJ's argument). The Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals recognized the importance of a prompt judicial decision was to "ensure
that licensing officials do not exceed their authority under the ordinance in their
zeal to protect the local community." Id. The court found the ordinance invalid
because it failed to require prompt judicial decision, and therefore, was unconsti-
tutional. See id. at 1241.
37. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2222 (recognizing circuit courts are split over
this issue); see also Merritt, supra note 3, at A20 (recognizing Court's ruling will
conclude thirteen year dispute among federal courts over this issue).
38. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2221-22.
39. See id. at 2224 (stating prompt-ddicial review necessarily includes prompt
judicial decision, thereby rejecting Littleton's arguments to contrary).
40. See id. at 2224-26 (giving four reasons why Colorado's ordinary judicial
review procedures suffice as long as courts are aware of need to prevent First
Amendment harms). For a detailed discussion of the four reasons, see also supra
notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
2332005]
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sis.41 Because of Colorado's existing judicial review rules, the Court
found the ordinance to be constitutional. 42
III. BACKGROUND
The First Amendment encourages free expression, one of the
most fundamental ideals in American society.43 The freedom of ex-
pression guaranteed by the First Amendment is not restricted only
to speech, it also includes other forms of expression. 44 The Su-
41. See Z.J. Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2224 (holding whether courts are sensitive to
First Amendment harms should be determined on case by case determination, not
on facial challenge).
42. See id. at 2226 (reversing judgment of Tenth Circuit).
43. For the text of the First Amendment, see supra note 9; see also Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (indicating presumption that regulation of
speech will hurt freedom of ideas). The Court in Reno stated:
As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of the content of
speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to
encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a
democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of
censorship.
521 U.S. at 885; see also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47
(1986) (recognizing importance of free speech in society as reason for presump-
tion of invalidity). "This Court has long held that regulations enacted for the pur-
pose of restraining speech on the basis of its content presumptively violate the First
Amendment." Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 46-47; see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (asserting that despite differences in religion and
politics, "'liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right
conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy"') (quoting Cantwell v. Conn.,
310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)); Tony Mauro, First Amendment plays second fiddle this term,
at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=13690 (last visited Mar.
26, 2005) (citing former Justice William Brennan Jr.'s opinion that First Amend-
ment was most important part of Constitution and that remainder of Constitution
flowed from it); Smolla, supra note 11 (discussing how Americans have internal-
ized value of freedom of speech and now it is core belief that is fundamental to
society as "article of constitutional faith").
44. See Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) ("Entertain-
ment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures,
programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musi-
cal and dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee."). See generally
Smolla, supra note 11 (discussing evolution of First Amendment in Supreme Court
decisions over past fifty years). Smolla, the Dean of the University of Richmond
School of Law, asserted that during the past half-century, the decisions of the Su-
preme Court have given Americans the liberty under the First Amendment to:
" Desecrate the national flag as a symbol of protest.
" Burn the cross as an expression of racial bigotry and hatred.
" Espouse the violent overthrow of the government as long as it is mere
abstract advocacy and not an immediate incitement to violence.
" Traffic in sexually explicit erotica as long as it does not meet a rigorous
definition of "hard core" obscenity.
" Defame public officials and public figures with falsehoods provided
they are not published with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disre-
gard for the truth.
[Vol. 12: p. 227
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preme Court has held, however, that there are limits to First
Amendment protection and freedom of expression is not abso-
lute. 45 In particular, the Court has ruled while adult entertainment
is considered a protected form of expression, it is entitled to less
protection than other types of expression.4 6 A problem may arise
when determining how much protection will be sufficient for adult
businesses under the lesser protection standard.
Even though it may be a lesser protection, the First Amend-
ment still protects adult businesses. Therefore, any regulation that
seeks to inhibit protected expression must satisfy certain require-
ments. 4 7 To ensure constitutionality, regulation of protected
speech may not result in prior restraint before it reaches "the mar-
ket place of ideas.' '4 8 Cities are allowed to regulate the industry as
long as there is sufficient governmental interest in the activity.
4 9
* Disseminate information invading personal privacy if the revelation is
deemed "newsworthy."
" Engage in countless other forms of expression that would be outlawed
in many nations but are regarded as constitutionally protected here.
Id.
45. SeeYoung v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (acknowl-
edging there are First Amendment guarantees regarding expression, but there is
more interest in protecting certain types of speech over others); see also Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (holding freedom of expression is
not end of inquiry because Constitution does not require absolute freedom at all
times in all places). See generally Collins, supra note 13 (stating whether free speech
claim is upheld often will depend on type of expression that is involved).
46. See Young, 427 U.S. at 70-71 (holding erotic, nonobscene materials are
protected by First Amendment, but get less protection than other forms of speech
such as political speech). The Court decided lesser protection for sexually based
materials was appropriate because:
[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate
the total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic
value, it is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of expres-
sion is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in
untrammeled political debate.
Id. at 70.
47. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 227 (1990) (stating proce-
dural safeguards are necessary to ensure constitutionality).
48. See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 56 (1953) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) (discussing tradition of First Amendment and banning censorship or prior
restraint because publishers bid "for the minds of men in the market place of
ideas").
49. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (holding "when
'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms"); see also City of
L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 439-40 (2002) (referring to City of Ren-
ton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) as premise for allowing city to
rely on data showing adult businesses attract crime and holding to be significant
government interest). As the Court in Alameda Books explained, Renton drew a dis-
tinction between the two inquiries that are made when analyzing an ordinance. See
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Negative secondary effects of the adult business industry have been
ruled to be a significant governmental interest.50 This secondary
effects doctrine was initially enforced in zoning of adult businesses,
but was expanded to include other activities such as nude danc-
ing.51 There are several types of zoning plans that are used to han-
dle adult businesses in a city.52 Regardless of the method a city
Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 440. The first inquiry is whether the municipal ordi-
nance is content neutral, which "requires courts to verify that the 'predominate
concerns' motivating the ordinance 'were with the secondary effects of adult
[speech], and not with the content of adult [speech]."' Id. at 440-41 (quoting
Renton, 475 U.S. at 47). The second is whether the ordinance is designed to serve a
significant government interest and does not unreasonably limit other avenues of
communication. See id. at 441. This second inquiry goes further and asks the mu-
nicipality to demonstrate a connection between the activity sought to be sup-
pressed and the secondary effects the ordinance supposedly prevents. See id. The
Court determined that municipalities have more experience and understanding of
the secondary effects, so the Court only required municipalities to "rely upon evi-
dence that is 'reasonably believed to be relevant' to the secondary effects that they
seek to address." Id. at 442; see also Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 333 F.
Supp. 2d 773, 783 (S.D. Ind. 2004) (stating First Amendment is implicated any
time city "seeks to single out adult entertainment businesses and regulate them
through licensing, operational and zoning laws," but ordinances are constitutional
as "long as they are content-neutral regulations of speech which are designed to
serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative
avenues of communication").
50. See Young, 427 U.S. at 71 (holding local governments are allowed to re-
strict adult businesses to prevent negative secondary effects such as crime, deterio-
ration of retail trade, and decrease in property value, and that city's "interest in
attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high
respect"); see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 49 (stating zoning regulations designed to
prevent undesirable secondary effects of adult businesses are legitimate "'content-
neutral' time, place and manner regulations"). The Court in Renton held because
the ordinance was designed to serve a significant governmental interest, it was
deemed content neutral. See id. at 4749.
51. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 584 (1991) (recognizing
nude dancing is constitutionally protected expression, but deciding Indiana's pub-
lic nudity ban did not violate First Amendment). "'We cannot accept the view that
an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.'" Id. at 570
(quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376). The Court criticized the expansive interpreta-
tion of "speech" because if construed broadly enough, almost anything would be
considered expressive conduct. See id.; see also City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S.
277, 289 (1999) ("Being 'in a state of nudity' is not an inherently expressive condi-
tion .... [N]ude dancing.., is expressive conduct, although we think it falls only
within the outer ambit of the First Amendment's protection."); Dream Palace v.
County of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 1014 (9th Cir. 2004) (referring to Alameda Books
determination that ordinances do not have to be limited to expressive activities,
they may also apply to massage parlors which city has found cause secondary
effects).
52. See You want to fight porn in your community, but don't know how to start. Here's
what you can do (and how MIM can help you), at http://www.moralityinmedia.org/
index.htm?fightPorn.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005) (giving instructions on how
to combat "sexually oriented businesses"). Morality in the Media is a non-profit,
interfaith organization founded in 1962 by Father Morton A. Hill, S.J. in NewYork.
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uses, the First Amendment prohibits a municipality from com-
pletely prohibiting adult businesses simply because the city does not
want them there. 53 Critics argue the secondary effects doctrine is
simply a disguise for government officials to zone undesirable busi-
nesses out of their cities.54 This is particularly true, they argue, be-
See id. Its purpose is to combat obscenity and "provide a brief overview of what
constitutionally can be done to combat illegal hardcore pornography (obscenity)
and 'sexually oriented businesses' in your community .... Id.
Morality in the Media defines the three types of zoning for sexually oriented
businesses as follows:
" Cluster: require "sexually oriented businesses" to locate in one area
(e.g., Boston's "Combat Zone").
" Scatter: prohibit "sexually oriented businesses" from locating within a
specified distance from each other and from residential districts,
schools, houses of worship and parks.
" Mixed: prohibit "sexually oriented businesses" from locating within a
specified distance from each other and from residential districts,
schools, houses of worship and parks AND require them to locate only
in specified industrial and/or commercial districts.
Id.
53. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not pro-
hibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable."); see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (stating zoning interests must be
unrelated to suppression of protected expression); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) (determining offensive conduct alone is not enough to
justify suppressing it). The fact that the city may not want an adult business within
its boundaries is not enough to grant it the power to prohibit it. See Pacifica, 438
U.S. at 745-46. The Court stated:
[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason
for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense,
that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection.
For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the government must
remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.
Id.; see also Young, 427 U.S. at 82 (stating if city wants to restrict adult businesses, in
this case theaters, it must try to close or restrict them; it cannot do it through
zoning).
54. See Daniel Barbarisi, City tries another road for adult zoning plan, PROVIDENCE
J.-BULL., Dec. 10, 2002, at CI (discussing Providence's proposed plan to keep all
adult businesses to small area in corner of city that had no road access). The
Rhode Island courts held the ordinance was unconstitutional and the city tried to
overcome it by building a road leading to the area. See id.; see also Maimon, supra
note 18, at Al (quoting town's attorney who said zoning is easiest way to win battle
against adult businesses through "simple land-use code"); James G. Sotos, Town
stripped of ordinance aimed at adult business, CHI. DAILv L. BULL., Feb. 6, 2003, at 6
(discussing how local politicians will handle community concerns by enacting zon-
ing laws which force adult businesses to town); States allowed to block cities' phone
business, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FR, EE PREss, Mar. 25, 2004, at C6 [hereinafter Phone
Business] (noting Littleton's attorney, Andrew Nathan, argued sex shops exposed
city to damaging secondary effects); David L. Hudson Jr., Secondary-effects doctrine, at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/speech/adultent/topic.aspx?topic=secon-
dary-effects-topic (June 24, 2004) (discussing even though Supreme Court has
protected nonobscene adult expression under First Amendment, government reg-
ulators simply use secondary effects doctrine to shut adult businesses down).
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cause the correlation between adult businesses and negative
secondary effects is highly suspect.55 Therefore, using secondary
effects as the basis to restrict the entire adult entertainment indus-
try is problematic. 56
The operation of adult businesses and pornography tends to
be a sensitive issue, and tension has existed between adult busi-
nesses and city officials since the Supreme Court decided adult en-
tertainment was a constitutionally protected industry.57  Some
argue that prohibition is essential to maintain morality in society
and to prevent the deleterious effects the industry has on the com-
munity and on individuals.58 Conversely, regulation of adult busi-
55. See Hudson, supra note 54 (citing Florida-based land use planner, Bruce
McLaughlin, who has analyzed many secondary effects studies). McLaughlin
claimed there were two main flaws with these studies. See id. First, there was an
"incestuous relationship among the various studies" because most of the studies
that the government uses are not independent. See id. Second, of the forty studies
that McLaughlin himself has conducted, he found almost no evidence of the ad-
verse secondary effects. See id.
56. See id. (discussing McLaughlin's skepticism of relying on outdated studies
that have not been conclusively proven).
57. See James Lawlor, Adult Business License Laws Must Provide Prompt Judicial
Decision, PLANNING, Oct. 2004, at 39 ("Of all the decisions handed down during the
2003-04 term, this [Z.J. Gifts] has most practical significance for planners and mu-
nicipal officials."); see also Young, 427 U.S. at 70-71 (acknowledging First Amend-
ment prohibits complete suppression of adult businesses). See generally Marcus v.
Search Warrant of Property, 367 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (discussing obscenity and
constitutionally protected speech). The regulation of the adult industry began
with obscenity, however, the Court in Marcus acknowledged that there was a distin-
guishing line between constitutionally unprotected obscenity and constitutionally
protected nonobscene material. See id. The Court explained that it had "expressly
recognized the complexity of the test of obscenity... and the vital necessity in its
application of safeguards to prevent denial of 'the protection of freedom of speech
and press for material which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to prurient
interest.'" Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957)).
58. The adult business industry may have negative secondary effects such as
increase in crime and decrease in property value. For further discussion of nega-
tive secondary effects, see supra note 50; see also Victor B. Cline, Ph.D., Pornography's
Effects on Adults and Children, at http://www.moralityinmedia.org/pornsEffects/
clineart.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005) (discussing numerous dangerous effects of
pornography on both adults and children). Dr. Cline, a clinical psychologist and
professor at the University of California at Berkeley, treated approximately 350 sex
addicts and sex offenders and came to several conclusions. See id. According to
Cline, pornography viewing is a four step process starting with addiction and end-
ing with acting out sexually. See id. In this last stage, a person will act out sexual
behavior seen in pornography. See id. The major consequence of pornography
addiction, however, is not the possibility of committing a violent sex act; rather, it
is the "disturbance of the fragile bonds of intimate family and marital relation-
ships. This is where the most grievous pain, damage, and sorrow occur. There is
repeatedly an interference with or even destruction of healthy love and sexual rela-
tionships with long-term bonded partners." Id.; see also Pauli. McGeady, The Harm-ful Effects of Pornography, at http://www.moralityinmedia.org/pornsEffects/
harmfuleffects.htm (Sept. 22, 2000) (discussing effects of pornography and sum-
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nesses involves the suppression of free speech, and therefore,
intrudes on the fundamental principle that uninhibited free speech
is essential.5 9
Once adult businesses became protected, there was a rapid in-
crease in the number of businesses across the country.60 It has be-
come a very lucrative industry, profitable enough for major
corporations to notice and get involved, which has increased the
stake city planners have in regulating adult businesses. 61 In re-
sponse, city governments began drafting regulations as a way to
monitor these businesses.62 One element of the licensing scheme is
what type of review the applicant is entitled to in the event that the
application is denied. The issue is whether the applicant receives a
prompt judicial decision or access to prompt judicial review, and
marizing article by Cline). McGeady lists twelve reasons why pornography is harm-
ful to society and individuals:
1. Harm to the Soul
2. Harm to Personal Morality and Chastity
3. Harm to Public Morality
4. Harm to Marriage
5. Harm of Violence Toward Women
6. Harm of Degradation of Women
7. Harm to Children
8. Harm of stimulations resulting in Rape
9. Harm of Contracting AIDS and other Venereal Diseases in Peep
Show Booths and Spreading the Same to the Public
10. Harm to Performers in the production of porno films and videos
11. Harm to Performers in Nude Dancing Establishments
12. Harm to innocent persons criminally assaulted and murdered by
those stimulated by porn, including Serial Murderers
Id.
59. For discussion of the importance of the First Amendment, see supra note
43 and accompanying text; see alsoJoseph Gerth, Adult-store case could aid local law,
COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), June 9, 2004, at BI (quoting adult business attorney,
Frank Mascagni, stating "'[w]hat scares me is this conservative court allowing gov-
ernment to continue placing regulations on lawful businesses'").
60. SeeJohn Gilmore, Zoned Out: A new take on regulating adult uses, PLANNING,
Feb. 1999, at 16 (citing survey conducted in 1994 which showed in New York City,
there was thirty percent increase in adult businesses in preceding five years).
61. See id. at 20 (commenting that "[a]dult businesses are here to stay"); see
alsoJames Harder, Porn 500, INsIGHT ON NEws, Jan. 8, 2001, at 10 (stating pornog-
raphy sales in United States was over $10 billion in 1999, and as result, General
Motors Corp. and AT&T have tried to get involved and make profits).
62. See Gilmore, supra note 60, at 15 (discussing how increase in adult busi-
nesses in New York City has created "a powerful incentive for the new regula-
tions"); see also Daniel Yi, Adult Businesses Determined to Run in Anaheim, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 1999, at B1 (discussing California cities strict view on adult businesses and
their hostility towards it). The city of Tustin, California, has an ordinance regulat-
ing adult businesses, but there are not any adult businesses in the city. See id.
Anaheim, California, was the first known city to criminally prosecute a violation of
municipal adult business regulation. See id.
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the uncertainty surrounding the question is not a new
development. 63
The Supreme Court has passed up the opportunity to resolve
this issue in the past, forcing circuits to decide for themselves. 64 As
a result, the circuits have drawn their own conclusions resulting in a
fairly even split.6 5 The split is caused by conflicting interpretations
of the two leading Supreme Court cases in this area.
In the first case, Freedman v. Maryland,66 the defendant chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a Maryland statute that required sub-
mission of all motion pictures to the Maryland Board of Censors
before exhibition.67 The Court held a statute seeking to regulate
protected speech required procedural safeguards to prevent inhib-
iting protected expression.68 The Freedman court fashioned a three-
prong test to ensure that a statute had the necessary procedural
safeguards to prevent the danger of censorship.69 Every constitu-
tional statutory scheme must fulfill the following: the State must
bear the burden of showing the expression is unprotected, the pro-
cedure must require judicial determination, and the procedure
63. See Merritt, supra note 3, at A20 (recognizing there has been circuit split
on this issue for thirteen years).
64. See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 325 (2002) (acknowledging
this was one question that Court granted writ of certiorari to answer, but not reach-
ing it); see also City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 281
(2001) (recognizing question of whether judicial decision or prompt judicial re-
view must accompany adult business licensing schemes was raised, but dismissing
petition and not disturbing judgment of Wisconsin court).
65. See Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288, 297-98 (5th
Cir. 2003) (recognizing circuit split on issue, but holding because Supreme Court
passed up opportunity to resolve issue, it must follow own precedent set in TK's
Video, Inc. v. Denton County, 24 F.3d 705, 709 (5th Cir. 1994)).
66. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
67. See id. at 52-53 (stating facts of case). This case did not involve adult busi-
nesses directly, but it set forth the standard of review required in licensing
schemes. See id. at 58-59. The Maryland statute challenged in this case states:
It shall be unlawful to sell, lease, lend, exhibit or use any motion picture
film or view in the State of Maryland unless the said film or view has been
submitted by the exchange, owner, or lessee of the film or view and duly
approved and licensed by the Maryland State Board of Censors ....
Id. at 52 n.1 (citing MD. CODE ANN., Art. 66A, § 2 (1957)).
The Court reversed the Maryland Supreme Court decision which held this
statute to be valid and enforceable. See id. at 59-60. "The Maryland scheme fails to
provide adequate safeguards against undue inhibition of protected expression,
and this renders the § 2 requirement of prior submission of films to the Board an
invalid previous restraint." Id. at 60.
68. See id. at 57 ("'[U]nder the Fourteenth Amendment, a State is not free to
adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenity... without regard
to the possible consequences for constitutionally protected speech.'") (quoting
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731 (1961)).
69. See id. (describing three-prong test).
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must assure "prompt final judicial decision. ' 70 It is the language of
this last requirement which causes the problem at issue.
In the second case, FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,71 which was
decided twenty-five years later, the plaintiff sought review of the
court of appeals' decision that the city's licensing ordinance was
constitutional. 72 The plaintiff argued that the ordinance failed to
provide a definitive time limit for judicial review, and therefore, it
was unconstitutional. 73 The plurality of an extremely fragmented
Court held the licensing scheme was invalid because it constituted
an "impermissible prior restraint upon protected expression."
74
70. See id. at 58-59 (stating these requirements are necessary to ensure "sensi-
tivity to freedom of expression," to "minimize the deterrent effect of an interim
and possibly erroneous denial of a license," and without them, it may be "too bur-
densome to seek review of the censor's determination"). The Court recognized it
would be too burdensome to seek review of the censor's determination without the
safeguards. See id. at 59. The third requirement is necessary because "only a judi-
cial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to
freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suf-
fices to impose a valid final restraint." Id. at 58. Furthermore, "[a]ny restraint
imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits must similarly
be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compati-
ble with sound judicial resolution." Id. at 59. The Court recognized a "censor's
business is to censor," so a censor will likely be less sensitive to First Amendment
freedoms than a court would be. See id. at 57.
71. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
72. See id. at 220-22 (stating facts of case). FW/PBS involved a sexually ori-
ented business run by the Petitioner in Dallas. See id. at 220-21. The Dallas Code
challenged in this case defined a "sexually oriented business" as "an adult arcade,
adult bookstore or adult video store, adult cabaret, adult motel, adult motion pic-
ture theater, adult theater, escort agency, nude model studio, or sexual encounter
center." See id. at 220 (citing DALLAs CIv CODE, ch. 41A, § 41A-2(19) (1986)).
The ordinance regulated sexually oriented businesses through zoning, licensing,
and inspections. See id. at 220-21.
73. See id. at 223 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965)). The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the licensing scheme was
.an unconstitutional prior restraint that fails to provide adequate procedural safe-
guards as required by Freedman v. Maryland." Id. Because the licensing scheme did
not provide the requisite procedural safeguards, the plurality held the licensing
provision was an invalid prior restraint. See id. at 243.
74. See id. (commenting on separate opinions). In very brief summary, the
division among the justices was the following:
Justice O'Connor writing for the plurality withJustice Stevens andJustice Ken-
nedy, concluded the ordinance's licensing scheme violated the First Amendment
and only the first two safeguards from Freedman were necessary for all licensing
schemes. See id. They were undecided as to what role the third safeguard had. See
id. at 225-29. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, concurring, agreed the
ordinance's licensing scheme was invalid under the First Amendment under the
Freedman doctrine, but held that all three safeguards needed to be applied, not just
the first two. See id. at 238-43.
Three justices dissented. See id. Justice White, writing for himself and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, argued the Freedman safeguards were inapplicable to defeat the
facial challenge in this situation because the ordinance had sufficiently important
government interest to justify limiting First Amendment freedoms. See id. at 244-
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The Court summarized the procedural safeguards required by the
Freedman Court as the following:
(1) any restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed
only for a specified brief period during which the status
quo must be maintained; (2) expeditious judicial review of
that decision must be available; and (3) the censor must
bear the burden of going to court to suppress the speech
and must bear the burden of proof once in court.75
The language used by the FW/PBS Court is slightly different in that
it states "expeditious judicial review" is necessary rather than requir-
ing "prompt final judicial decision" like the Court in Freedman
required. 76
The circuits were split over whether FW/PBS changed the
meaning of the procedural safeguards given in Freedman.77 Five of
the circuits held prompt judicial review was sufficient to satisfy the
procedural safeguards requirement. 78 Furthermore, the Eleventh
Circuit claimed there was a significant difference between regulat-
ing adult businesses through licensing schemes and censorship of
48. Justice Scalia wrote a separate opinion, dissenting in part and concurring inpart. See id. at 250. He believed the ordinance should be held constitutional in all
respects because Dallas could have prohibited the activities, but chose to limit
them with the licensing scheme. See id. at 253. Because Dallas could have constitu-
tionally prohibited the activity, the details of the licensing scheme did not have to
comply with First Amendment standards. See id.
75. Id. at 227 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-60 (1965)).
76. Compare FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227 (stating "expeditious judicial review" is
all that is necessary), with Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59 (using language "prompt judi-
cial decision"). It is the difference in interpretation between the Court's use of the
words "review" and "decision" that has caused this debate. For further discussion
of the circuit split, see infra notes 77-79.
77. The First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits support the viewthat prompt judicial review is sufficient. For detailed discussion of the arguments
of these circuits, see infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. The Fourth, Sixth,Ninth, and Tenth Circuits support the view that a prompt judicial decision is re-quired for a licensing scheme to satisfy the First Amendment requirements. Forfurther discussion of the arguments of these circuits, see infra notes 83-85 and
accompanying text.
78. See Beal v. Stem, 184 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting without decidingthat promptjudicial access would be sufficient to satisfy Freedman); TK's Video, Inc.
v. Denton County, 24 F.3d 705, 709 (5th Cir. 1994) (interpreting FW/PBS to only
require fair opportunity to complete administrative process and access to courts
within brief period); Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309, 1324-25 (7th Cir. 1993)(questioning need for procedural safeguards at all because writ of certiorari
should be proper method of review of administrative decisions, but recognizingSupreme Court has required safeguards in First Amendment cases even when writ
of certiorari was available); Jews forJesus, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 984 F.2d1319 (lst Cir. 1993) (implying access to judicial review is sufficient).
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constitutionally protected speech.79 Freedman's higher standard of
prompt judicial decision still controls when censorship is involved,
however, licensing schemes of adult businesses are not entitled to as
much protection.80 The argument is that the purpose of the First
Amendment protection is to prevent censorship.81
Four circuits disagreed with the view that access to prompt ju-
dicial review was sufficient to ensure constitutionality of a licensing
scheme.8 2 They argued the higher standard of a prompt judicial
decision was required in licensing, schemes for adult businesses.
83
There were two main reasons these circuits argued a prompt judi-
79. See Boss Capital, Inc. v. City of Casselberry, 187 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th Cir.
1999) (stating licensing schemes are different than censorship decisions and are
entitled to less protection, and therefore, prompt judicial access is sufficient).
80. See id. at 1256 (holding it is appropriate to give licensing schemes less
protection than censorship); see also City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 124 S.
Ct. 2219, 2227 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating Justice O'Connor in A/I
PBS recognized there was differences between censorship and ordinary licensing
schemes, and thus, there were different requirements from each).
81. See Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) ("To permit
the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for
each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free
from government censorship."); see also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 61-62
(1965) (Douglas, J., Black, J., concurring) (arguing any kind of censorship is unac-
ceptable); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 437, 446 (1957) (Douglas, J.,
Black, J., dissenting) (stating censor has "paralyzing power"); M.E. Sprengelmeyer,
Supreme Court backs Littleton, RocKy MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, Colo.),June 8, 2004,
at 23A (quoting ZJ's attorney, Arthur M. Schwartz, that freedom is law, not just
prevention of censorship, and adult businesses are entitled to prompt judicial
ruling).
82. The Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. For further discussion of
the position of these circuits, see infra notes 83-85.
83. See Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C. v. City of Littleton, 311 F.3d 1220, 1236 (10th Cir.
2002) (holding FW/PBS does not weaken Freedman and review without decision is
worthless); Nightclubs, Inc. v. City of Paducah, 202 F.3d 884, 893 (6th Cir. 2000)
("[I]f mere access to a judicial forum were sufficient, then the second Freedman
safeguard would be rendered virtually meaningless . . . to ensure entire review
process will be expeditious [because first two safeguards work together]."); Baby
Tam & Co., Inc. v. City of Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The
phrase [judicial review'] necessarily has two elements - (1) consideration of a
dispute by ajudicial officer, and (2) a decision. Without consideration, there is no
review; without a decision, the most exhaustive review is worthless."); 11126 Bait.
Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's County, Md., 58 F.3d 988, 999-1000 (4th Cir.
1995) (listing four reasons why prompt decision is necessary). According to the
Fourth Circuit, there are four reasons why a prompt decision is required and not
prompt judicial review. See 11126Balt. Boulevard, 58 F.3d at 999. First, FW/PBS was
a fragmented decision, so it cannot alter Freedman. See id. Second, FW/PBS does
not relax the prompt judicial review requirement as given in Freedman. See id. at
1000. Third, the phrase "promptjudicial review" does not support the conclusion
that FW/PBS relaxed the requirement because the two phrases are often used sy-
nonymously. See id. Lastly, the court argues thatJustice White's dissent in FW/PBS
presents an argument that there is no suggestion that licensing decisions are not
subject to immediate appeal to the courts. See id.
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cial decision was required. First, the three procedural safeguards
work together to be effective, and review of an administrative deci-
sion without a determination of its validity would be worthless.8 4
Second, the term 'judicial review" necessarily implies a decision will
be rendered.85
Adult businesses and the First Amendment are both sensitive
issues that often invoke strong feelings in opposition or support,
and as a result, Z.J. Gifts generated attention from various organiza-
tions.86 A fair number of individuals from the general public be-
84. See Z.J Gifts, 311 F.3d at 1236 (stating review without decision is worth-less); see also Nightclubs, 202 F.3d at 893 (stating safeguards work together and deci-
sion is necessary).
85. See Baby Tam, 154 F.3d at 1101 (stating judicial review must have both
review of dispute and decision).
86. There were many amici curiae briefs for both the Petitioner and the Re-
spondent which represent the wide variety of organizations that became involvedin this case. See City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 124 S. Ct. 2219 (2004)(listing organizations that filed briefs). For a full discussion of the amici curiae
briefs, see supra note 14. The First Amendment Lawyer's Association wrote an
amicus curiae brief in support of the Respondent. See Brief of Amicus Curiae FirstAmendment Lawyers Association at 1, City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 124S. Ct. 2219 (2004) (No. 02-1609) (noting First Amendment Lawyer's Association("FALA") is dedicated to battling governmental abuses of licensing ordinances
throughout country). Additionally, FALA stated if the decision of Tenth Circuit is
reversed "these abuses are likely to continue" and "[s]uch a result not only ad-
versely affects the clients of nearly every FALA attorney, but it also contravenes theFirst Amendment protections FALA and its members are dedicated to preserving."
Id. at 2. The American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression, Association ofAmerican Publishers, Inc., Comic Book Legal Defense Fund, Freedom to ReadFoundation, International Periodical Distributors Association, Publishers Market-
ing Association, and Video Software Dealers Association wrote an amici curiaebrief in favor of the Respondent. See Brief of Amici Curiae American BooksellersFoundation for Free Expression, et al. at 2-4, City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4,L.L.C., 124 S. Ct. 2219 (2004) (No. 02-1609) (demonstrating interest in case by
noting all these businesses own and operate retail establishments that sell books,
videos, and other materials, and finding it "both intolerable and unconstitutional
to permit an existing business selling First Amendment-protected material to be
closed" or "prevented from commencing business while waiting for a court to
render an opinion").
The Conference of State Legislatures, National Association of Counties, andU.S. Conference of Mayors joined the American Planning Association as amici cu-
riae in support of the Petitioner. See Brief of Amici Curiae the National League ofCities, et al. at 1-2, City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D4, L.L.C., 124 S. Ct. 2219 (2004)(No. 02-1609) (stating regulation of adult businesses is vital to well being of devel-
oping communities and "essential for the prevention of crime, the preservation ofproperty values, and the maintenance of neighborhood quality"). Ohio and four-
teen other states wrote an amici curiae brief in support of the Petitioner. See Brief
of Amici Curiae Ohio et al. at 1, City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 124 S. Ct.2219 (2004) (No. 02-1609) (stating States have right to regulate businesses withinborders, including adult businesses, and there is strong interest in ensuring success
of regulation especially for adult businesses because they bring in negative secon-dary effects). Lastly, the Community Defense Counsel wrote an amicus curiaebrief in support of the Petitioner. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Community Defense
18
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came involved and voiced their opinions.8 7 There were arguments
supporting both views, including organizations and people such as
religiously affiliated morality groups, the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU"), and present and past employees of the adult busi-
ness industry.88 Additionally, before and after the decision was ren-
dered, people tried to predict the practical impact the decision
would have. These predictions have varied from having no effect at
all to having a significant influence upon every city in the United
States.89
IV. NARRATvE ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court held that in order to ensure constitution-
ality, the adult business licensing scheme in Littleton, Colorado was
required to provide a prompt judicial decision when an applicant
Counsel at 1, City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 124 S. Ct. 2219 (2004) (No.
02-1609) (stating Community Defense Counsel ("CDC") is responsible for drafting
hundreds of adult business ordinances across country because "crime, blight, and
spread of disease caused by sexually oriented businesses are an ongoing concern
for the local governments").
87. See Enforcing Morality, supra note 17, at 14 (discussing views of various
groups on why this area of law is important). Some of the reasons that Hudson
provides are the First Amendment, attempting to regulate human sexuality, or at-
tempting to enforce morality in society. See id.
88. See David Grogan, Free Speech Defeat: Supreme Court Sides With Littleton, Colo-
rado, at http://news.bookweb.org/freeexpression/
2 6 36
.html (June 17, 2004) (not-
ing First Amendment supporters disappointed with decision because accelerated
procedures with two to three day limits do not apply to city licensing schemes); see
also Hilden, supra note 3 (discussing importance of prompt decisions). Hilden
argues that the speaker and other potential speakers who are aware of the situation
may be silenced during waiting period. See Hilden, supra note 3. So, a prompt
decision is essential. See id.; see also David Sherman, Sexually Oriented Businesses: An
Insider's View, Proponent Testimony, S.B. 251, Ohio S. Judiciary Comm. on Civil
Justice (Dec. 3, 2002) (discussing dangers and rampant illegal activities of adult
entertainment industry); Jerry Lyon, Dancer Hotline Launched in Cincinnati, OHIO
CITIzENs' COURIER, Dec. 2002, at 1 (discussing dangers of adult entertainment on
society and particularly on girls that work in industry); Tony Mauro, Advocates find
little to cheer in free-speech victory, at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analy-
sis.aspx?id=13488 (June 8, 2004) [hereinafter Little Cheer] (discussing why this may
not be victory at all for supporters of First Amendment); Sotos, supra note 54, at 6
(discussing balance between politicians who attempt zoning and those who believe
ordinances are just method for religious right to try and enforce morality on
society).
89. See George Merritt, Adult bookstore loses ruling, DENVER PosT, June 8, 2004,
at B5 [hereinafter Loses Ruling] (stating some think this ruling will have impact on
all cities, while others think decision is narrow and will only impact Colorado law);
see also Merritt, supra note 3, at A20 (discussing impact decision may have on cities'
ordinances); Jennifer Netherby, Court win for adult biz, VIDEO Bus., June 14, 2004,
at 8 (discussing impact of ruling is unclear because court issued no rule changes
on how lower courts must meet requirements); The U.S. Supreme Court; Slants &
Trends; Brief Article, LAND USE L. REP., June 16, 2004, at 89 [hereinafter Slants]
(stating decision will most likely lead to additional litigation).
2005]
19
Cynn: City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C.: Are We Losing the Fi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
246 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
appealed a denied license.90 Although the Court established that a
prompt judicial decision was necessary, it did not provide a defini-
tive time limit that would satisfy the "prompt" requirement.9' It ar-
gued the First Amendment does not require the ordinance to
specifically state special judicial review rules, rather, just that
prompt judicial review must be provided in some way.9 2
Littleton sought review of the decision of the court of appeals,
claiming the Tenth Circuit erred in finding the ordinance unconsti-
tutional. 93 The Court accepted the case, but agreed with the lower
court's decision that a prompt judicial decision was necessary to
comply with the First Amendment.94 The underlying reason for re-
quiring the Freedman procedural safeguards in licensing schemes
regulating First Amendment protected businesses is to prevent un-
due delay, which results in the unconstitutional suppression of pro-
tected speech. 95 Acknowledging this purpose, the Court decided
the language of FW/PBS indicating "prompt judicial review" neces-
sarily encompassed giving a prompt judicial decision. 96
Littleton argued there was significance to the linguistic differ-
ence between 'judicial review" and "prompt final judicial deci-
sion."97 Several other circuits have also used this argument in
making their determination that access to prompt judicial review
90. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2224 (stating Court rejected Littleton's argu-ment that prompt judicial review does not encompass prompt judicial decision).
91. See id. (accepting Littleton's argument that First Amendment does not
require specific time limits to be written directly into licensing schemes in caseslike these, and finding Colorado's ordinary judicial review procedures were ade-quate as long as courts remembered potential threat of First Amendment harms).
92. See id. ("[T]he First Amendment does not require special 'adult business'judicial review rules; and the First Amendment does not insist that Littleton writedetailed judicial review rules into the ordinance itself.").
93. See id. at 2222-23 (giving two reasons Littleton used to support claim).Littleton had two arguments. See id. The first was that the First Amendment pro-
cedural requirements of FW/PBS required prompt access to judicial review, but theFirst Amendment did not require prompt judicial determination. See id. Second,Littleton argued even if the First Amendment does require a prompt judicial de-
termination, Colorado law satisfied any such requirement. See id. at 2223.
94. See id. at 2222, 2224 (holding prompt judicial review encompasses judicialdecision and stating Court granted certiorari because of uncertainty in lower
courts on issue). There has been a circuit split on this issue for the past thirteenyears. See Merritt, supra note 3, at A20 (giving overview of circuit split on issue).
95. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2224 (holding licenses for constitutionally pro-tected business must be issued within reasonable amount of time to prevent sup-pression, and discussing how safeguards were meant to prevent undue delay in
both judicial and administrative procedures).
96. See id. (rejecting any of Littleton's arguments that were contrary).
97. See id. at 2222-23 (explaining plurality in FW/PBS did not use word "deci-
sion," they only spoke of "possibility of prompt judicial review" and O'Connor in-
tentionally chose to use different language than Freedman).
[Vol. 12: p. 227
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was sufficient. 98 The Court, however, rejected this argument as triv-
ial.99 FW/PBS specifically stated it was not radically changing the
procedural safeguards from Freedman.10 0 The distinction Littleton
sought between the language of the two cases would be a substan-
tial departure from the purpose of the Freedman procedural safe-
guards. 1 1 The Freedman procedural safeguards were intended to
prevent delays in both the administrative and judicial procedures of
a licensing scheme. 10 2 Furthermore, the Court found FW/PBS also
recognized this purpose so, in effect, there was no basis to Lit-
tleton's argument in the semantic distinction.
10 3
Once the Court established a prompt judicial decision was re-
quired for every constitutional licensing scheme, it had to decide
what standards to use to ensure that a prompt judicial decision
would occur. 10 4 The Court decided Colorado's regular judicial re-
view rules were sufficient to ensure "not only that access to the
courts can be promptly obtained, but also that ajudicial decision will
98. See Boss Capital, Inc. v. City of Casselberry, 187 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th Cir.
1999) (noting language used in FW/PBS was intentional because it acknowledged
difference between censorship and licensing schemes and was attempting to treat
unlike things differently); see also Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2227 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (holding Justice O'Connor in FW/PBS recognized there were differences be-
tween censorship and ordinary licensing schemes); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
493 U.S. 215, 240-41 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing distinction
made by plurality between judicial review and judicial decision was intentional).
Justice Brennan argued that, in FW/PBS, Justice O'Connor intentionally wanted
judicial review to apply only to licensing schemes that did not involve censorship.
See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 240-41. She wanted, however, to preserve the higher stan-
dard of a judicial decision in cases involving censorship. See id.
99. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2223-24 ("[T]he city's argument makes too
much of too little.").
100. See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 228 (stating first two safeguards of Freedman, that
licensor's decision must be made within reasonable time and prompt judicial re-
view, are both essential); see also Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2224 (deciding prompt
judicial decision was necessary). Consequently, the Court also had to reject Lit-
tleton's first contention that FW/PBS only required prompt access to judicial re-
view. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2224.
101. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2224 (stating Littleton wants to change Freed-
man core requirements from judicial decision to judicial review).
102. See id. ("A delay in issuing a judicial decision, no less than a delay in
obtaining access to a court, can prevent a license from being 'issued within a rea-
sonable period of time."') (quoting FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 228). The Court here
draws the conclusion that this statement means prompt judicial review must en-
compass a prompt judicial decision. See id.
103. See id. (inferring FW/PBS plurality's reference to prompt judicial review
and Justice Brennan's separate opinion read together meant prompt judicial deci-
sion was required).
104. See id. (acknowledging Freedman created model for what was meant by
"prompt," however, court disagreed with First Amendment requiring special spe-
cific time limit be put directly in ordinance).
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be promptly forthcoming." 105 According to the Court, the First
Amendment does not require special detailed judicial review rules
written into the ordinance itself.106 In general, court procedural
rules and practices of each state, Colorado included, are sufficient
to ensure undue delay does not occur as long as the courts remain
aware of the need to prevent possible First Amendment
violations. 107
The Court gave four reasons as the basis for its holding that
Colorado's judicial review rules were sufficient to ensure a promptjudicial decision. 108 The first reason was "ordinary court procedu-
ral rules and practices, in Colorado as elsewhere, provide reviewing
courts with judicial tools sufficient to avoid delay-related First
Amendment harm." 109 Second, there was "no reason to doubt the
willingness of Colorado's judges to exercise these powers wisely so
as to avoid serious threats of delay-induced First Amendment
harm."'110 Third, the Court recognized the First Amendment harm
at risk in this case was different than the harm in Freedman.111 The
105. Id. Littleton had two arguments, first that there was a significant seman-
tic difference between the language used in Freedman and FW/PBS and so promptjudicial decision is different than access to prompt judicial review. See id. at 2223.For full discussion of this argument, see supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
The Court rejected this first argument as trivial. See id. at 2223-24. The sec-
ond argument Littleton made was that Colorado's judicial review laws were suffi-
cient to ensure undue delay will not result in the licensing scheme. See id. at 2224.In making its decision, the Court accepted the second argument and concluded
the judicial review laws of Colorado, and most states, provided enough protection
from the harms of potential delays in an adult business licensing scheme. See id. at
2224-25.
106. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2224 (stating "the First Amendment does not
require special 'adult business' judicial review rules; and the First Amendment
does not insist that Littleton write detailed judicial review rules into the ordinance
itself").
107. See id. (finding "ordinary judicial review procedures suffice as long as the
courts remain sensitive to the need to prevent First Amendment harms and admin-
ister those procedures accordingly"). The Court decided whether a court has met
its burden of judicial review and is adequately sensitive to potential First Amend-
ment threats should be decided on a case-by-case basis. See id. This is not to be
decided on a facial challenge. See id.
108. See id. (stating Court reached conclusion for four reasons).
109. Id. at 2224-25. The Court determined that state courts have the power to
.arrange their schedules to 'accelerate' proceedings" and "higher courts may
quickly review adverse lower court decisions." Id. at 2225. Both of these powers
show the procedural rules within the states are enough to prevent undue delay in a
licensing scheme. See id.
110. Id. at 2225. The assumption was that courts are aware First Amendment
harms exist and they need to avoid undue delay because undue delay will result in
the suppression of protected speech. See id.
111. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2225 (distinguishing Freedman). In particular,
Freedman involved the approval of a political film. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51, 52 (1965) (naming French film "Revenge at Daybreak" as movie sought to
22
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difference was significant enough to decrease the need for impos-
ing a special, procedural decision-making time limit in this situa-
tion.112 Lastly, the Court noted neither FW/PBS nor Freedman
require a city or state to put the judicial review safeguard in the
ordinance. 13
The Court took these four criteria and concluded that Colo-
rado's ordinary rules of judicial review were adequate to satisfacto-
rily prevent the First Amendment harms concerning this particular
ordinance. 114 This would not necessarily be the case for every ordi-
nance, only the ones that do not seek to censor constitutionally pro-
tected expression. 1 5 In cases like this one, which did not involve
censorship, Colorado's ordinary rules of judicial review provide
enough assurance that First Amendment harms will be avoided." 6
There does not need to be extra protection written into the ordi-
nance itself unless censorship of constitutionally protected speech
is involved. 1" 7 Littleton's ordinance was an attempt to ensure adult
businesses' compliance with neutral and objective criteria; it in-
volved no censorship of constitutionally protected expression, and
be censored). The 1952 movie, also known as "Desperate Decision" and "LaJeune
Folle" takes place in Ireland and features a nun whose brother is executed by the
IRA leader whom she worships. See Movie Database, at http://www.tvguide.com/
Movies/database/showmovie.asp?MI=14591#review (last visited Mar. 28, 2005)
(giving brief summary of film). If the film was not approved by the Maryland
Board of Censors, it would not be shown and there would be no other outlet for
that movie resulting in censorship. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2225. Here, Lit-
tleton's license scheme does not seek to censor material because there will be
adult businesses in Littleton regardless of whether Z.J. Gifts is allowed to operate
or not. See id.
112. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2225 (finding ordinance was easy to review so it
is unlikely to completely suppress any particular item of adult material from adult
businesses in Littleton, unlike censorship found in Freedman).
113. See id. at 2226 (recognizing how and whether state is to "incorporate the
required procedural safeguards in the statutory scheme is, of course, for the State
to decide") (quoting Freedman, 380 U.S. at 60).
114. See id. (finding Colorado's ordinary judicial review rules are adequate for
purposes of facial challenge to ordinance).
115. See id. at 2225 (recognizing Littleton's ordinance does not seek to cen-
sor, and it is objective and nondiscretionary). According to the Court, the criteria
of the ordinance is easy to apply so its use will be easy to review. See id. Further-
more, some adult businesses will satisfy the criteria and others will not. See id.
Therefore, the threat of unconstitutionality is reduced because there is still an
outlet to sell the protected material which will not result in a complete censorship
of the businesses. See id.
116. See id. at 2226 (holding ordinances that do not censor content are not
entitled to "an unusually speedy judicial decision of the Freedman type").
117. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2224 (accepting Littleton's argument that Freed-
man special judicial review rules did not apply in this case).
20051
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therefore, was not entitled to an especially prompt judicial
decision. 118
There were three concurring opinions: Justice Scalia and Jus-
tice Stevens each wrote one, and Justice Souter and Justice Kennedy
shared one. The significant opinion for purposes of analyzing judi-
cial review of the states is that of Justice Stevens. 119 Justice Stevens,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, wanted to em-
phasize that neutral licensing criteria was a "ministerial act" that
regulated speech.12 0 It was not an "exercise of discretionary judg-
ment that prohibits speech.' 121 Stevens expressed concern this de-
cision may eliminate an important and intentional distinction
between "prompt judicial decision" required in censorship cases
and access to prompt judicial review available in non-censorship
cases. 122
118. See id. at 2225-26 (listing characteristics of Littleton's ordinance that
made it less susceptible to dangers of censorship). The Court recognized that Lit-
tleton's ordinance was objective and neutral, and stated "Littleton's 'adult busi-
ness' licensing scheme does 'not present the grave dangers of a censorship
system.'" Id. (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 228 (1990)). The
Court claimed because the ordinance was neutral and objective and does not seek
to censor, it does not receive Freedman speed of judicial decision. See id. at 2226.
Even if ZJ. is not allowed to operate in the desired location, some adult businesses
will be able to satisfy the requirements of the ordinance, and thus, there will still be
adult businesses in Littleton, Colorado. See id. at 2225. Therefore, the application
of the ordinance does not result in censorship. See id.
119. See id. at 2226-28 (listing concurring opinions). The concurring opin-
ions of Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter are explained below.
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, agreed with the decision that the
act is unrelated to censorship of content and is therefore not entitled to judicial
priority. See id. at 2228 (Scalia, J., concurring). He argued "[t]he notion that me-
dia corporations have constitutional entitlement to accelerated judicial review of
the denial of zoning variances is absurd." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). He also ar-
gued ZJ. Gifts was not engaged in constitutionally protected activity because "the
pandering of sex is not protected by the First Amendment." Id. (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). Furthermore, because Littleton could have constitutionally prohibited the
activity that it chose to govern with § 3-14-2, the details of the licensing scheme did
not have to comply with the First Amendment. See id. (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. City
of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 253 (1990)).
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Kennedy joined, concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment, wrote separately only to emphasize that there needed
to be alignment between state procedures guaranteeing the prompt judicial deci-
sion and state judicial practice that ensured prompt decisions in state court. See id.
at 2227 (Souter, J., Kennedy, J., concurring). Littleton's ordinance was not as bad
as censorship, but not as innocent as zoning, so ensuring alignment is particularly
important here. See id.
120. See id. at 2227 (Stevens, J., concurring) (making distinction between this
ordinance and ordinances that seek to censor because, according to Justice Ste-
vens, this distinction is significant).
121. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
122. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2226-27 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Ste-
vens wrote:
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V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In deciding a prompt judicial decision was required in every
constitutional licensing scheme, the Supreme Court expressly over-
ruled the precedent and reasoning of five circuits. 12- Instead of
directly overturning its own precedent set in FW/PBS, the Court ar-
rived at its desired conclusion by recharacterizing that decision.
Even though FW/PBS used the phrase "prompt judicial review," this
phrase was interpreted in the context of this case to encompass a
prompt judicial decision. 124
This decision makes a blanket rule for all licensing schemes.
Regardless of whether censorship of political speech or regulation
of adult businesses is involved, a prompt judicial decision is re-
quired if a license is denied.12 5 The Court, however, indicated
where a regulation "simply conditions the operation of an adult
There is an important difference between an ordinance conditioning the
operation of a business on compliance with certain neutral criteria, on
the one hand, and an ordinance conditioning the exhibition of a motion
picture on the consent of a censor. The former is an aspect of the rou-
tine operation of a municipal government. The latter is a species of con-
tent-based prior restraint.
Id. at 2226 (citing Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309, 1330-33 (7th Cir. 1993)).
He argued FW/PBS intentionally used the language "possibility of prompt judicial
review" because it recognized the "differences between ordinary licensing schemes
and censorship systems warrant imposition of different procedural protections, in-
cluding different requirements with respect to which party must assume the bur-
den of taking the case to court, as well as the risk of judicial delay." Id. at 2227
(Stevens, J., concurring).
123. The First, Second, Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have all inter-
preted FW/PBS to hold that prompt judicial review is sufficient to ensure adult
business licensing schemes are constitutional. Most argue that the plain language
of FW/PBS states only "prompt judicial review" is necessary, and if more were re-
quired, it would have been explicit. For discussion of the arguments of the First,
Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, see supra notes 78-81.
124. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2224 (rejecting Littleton's argument that plain
language of FW/PBS says "prompt judicial decision" is semantically different than
access to prompt judicial review). Essentially, the Court looked at the policy rea-
sons for requiring the safeguards in the first place. See id. Their purpose is to
prevent undue delay, so the Court concluded this must encompass both judicial
and administrative delay. See id. Therefore, "prompt judicial review" must include
a prompt judicial decision. See id.
125. See id. at 2225-26 ("Littleton's 'adult business' licensing scheme does 'not
present the grave 'dangers of a censorship system."") (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v.
City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 228 (1990)). The Court points out that Littleton's
adult business ordinance does not rise to the level of censorship. See id. It further
holds that the licensing scheme must provide a prompt judicial decision. See id.
However, because the ordinance does not seek to censor, Colorado's courts can
prevent potential harm through their ordinary judicial review procedures; special
rules were not required to be written into the ordinance itself. See id. at 2226. So,
while the Court provides the required prompt judicial decision, it is of a lesser
degree than that provided in Freedman. See id.
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business on compliance with neutral and nondiscretionary criteria,
and does not seek to censor content, an adult business is not enti-
fled to an unusually speedy judicial decision of the Freedman
type." 1 2 6 In other words, all licensing schemes regulating constitu-
tionally protected material must provide a promptjudicial decision,
but different industries are entitled to different levels of protec-
tion.127 Adult business ordinances that are neutral and nondiscre-
tionary will still receive a prompt judicial decision, but it will not be
as prompt as licenses that seek to censor content.1 28 There is,
therefore, a spectrum of protections given through the safeguards,
and courts must decide where along the range a particular ordi-
nance will fall.12 9 If Justice Stevens and the Eleventh Circuit are
correct, then FW/PBS must be read to maintain that there are dif-
ferent types of First Amendment protections that should and were
intended to be treated differently. 130
126. Id. at 2226 (citation omitted); see also City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, 535
U.S. 425, 440 (2002) (recognizing content neutral ordinances were only entitled to
intermediate scrutiny because there was less chance they would be used "to dis-
criminate against unpopular speech").
127. SeeYoung v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976) (discussing
whether certain speech is protected under First Amendment will depend on its
content, and even when speech was found to be protected, different kinds of con-
tent may require different governmental responses).
128. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2226 (recognizing real threat is chilling effects
of censorship and censorship is not consequence of Littleton's licensing scheme,
so less protection is needed to ensure First Amendment rights are not stifled); see
also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 61-62 (1965) (Douglas, J., Black, J., con-
curring) (recognizing real problem is censorship). Justice Douglas does not agree
that "any form of censorship - no matter how speedy or prolonged it may be - is
permissible." Freedman, 380 U.S. at 62. He argued that he "would put an end to all
forms and types of censorship and give full literal meaning to the command of the
First Amendment." Id.
129. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2225 (recognizing there were different severi-
ties of First Amendment harms and ones that were less threatening will suffer less
from delays caused by judicial review, so not every First Amendment harm was
entitled to Freedman-speed judicial decisions); see also Collins, supra note 13 (dis-
cussing trends on how different justices rule on First Amendment cases). Collins
conducted some research on the voting records of the justices. See Collins, supra
note 13. At one time, there used to be a correlation between voting records and
how liberal a Court was, but it is not as simple anymore. See id. In commercial
speech claims, the percentage of statutes that were upheld by the justices were as
follows: Justices Scalia and Thomas: more than 75%, Justice Breyer: 33%, Justice
Ginsburg: 44%. See id. In sexual expression claims, however, the statistics are as
follows: Justice Scalia: 10%, Justice Thomas: 50%, Justice Ginsburg: 80%, Justice
Stevens: 90%. See id.
130. Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion specifically to ensure that the
decision of the majority would not diminish the difference between licensing
schemes that censor and licensing schemes for adult businesses. See Z.J Gifts, 124
S. Ct. at 2227 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens and the Eleventh Circuit
have held that the "prompt judicial review" language used in FW/PBS was inten-
tional because adult businesses are afforded less constitutional protection than
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Regulations of adult businesses, a constitutionally protected
form of expression, are acceptable because of the significant gov-
ernment interest involved in controlling the negative secondary ef-
fects. 131 The criteria for proving the negative secondary effects,
however, is very easy because a city is not required to conduct its
own research and may rely on studies done in other places. 132 It
could be argued that any regulation is premature because the sig-
nificant government interest has not been proven if there is no evi-
dence of the existence of the secondary effects, and governments
often rely on outdated studies. 133
Those who support First Amendment rights argue that a judi-
cial decision is required and that lesser protection afforded to the
licensing schemes of adult businesses may be detrimental to soci-
ety. 134 Specifically, the possibility of judicial review without the
promise of a quick decision is meaningless because court delays
may "lead to 'chilling effects' that can cause irretrievable losses -
which take the form of speech unheard, and messages unsent.' 35
It follows from this reasoning that unless all First Amendment pro-
censorship of protected speech. See id. Therefore, licensing schemes should only
be entitled to promptjudicial review, whereas, censorship should receive a prompt
judicial decision. See id. For full discussion, see supra notes 79-81 and accompany-
ing text.
131. For support of the secondary effects doctrine, see supra notes 50-51 and
accompanying text.
132. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986)
(stating First Amendment does not require city to conduct its own separate study
or produce independent evidence of secondary effects, and it may rely on studies
done by other cities as "long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably
believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses").
133. See Hudson, supra note 54 (quotingJohn Weston, First Amendment law-
yer, who argued Alameda Books before Supreme Court). Weston argues the city in
Alameda relied on a study done six years earlier in a different city. See id. The
Supreme Court reversed the appeals court grant of summary judgment to the
bookstore because it found that the city's conclusion was not reasonable. See id.
Weston argues that these effects do not exist and there is no evidence of them. See
id. (summing up advocate's contentions in case).
134. See Hilden, supra note 3 (discussing chilling effects this decision may
have on everyone, not just adult business owners); see also Loses Ruling, supra note
89, at B5 (quoting Larry Berkowitz, lawyer for Littleton, who predicts Z.J Gifts "will
have an impact on cities across the country"); Sprengelmeyer, supra note 81, at 23A
(quoting ZJ's attorney Arthur M. Schwartz that, "'[o]n a national scale, it [the
decision] put (governments) on notice that freedom is still the law. We are enti-
tled to a prompt judicial ruling ....').
135. Hilden, supra note 3 (discussing how cases involving speech are different
than cases about money). In cases that involve money, court delays can be com-
pensated. See id. No similar remedy is available in free speech cases, however,
because no money is involved. See id. At stake is the constitutionally protected
freedom of expression sought to be prevented. See id. Therefore, court delays in
speech cases will result in "chilling effects" on that freedom of expression. See id.
(describing possible adverse consequences of lack of "a quick decision").
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tected businesses are given the same rights, an ethical judgment
must be made that some businesses are somehow unworthy of pro-
tection. 13 6 The problem is the "First Amendment is supposed to
protect the right to say what one chooses - not only the right to say
what others think is worthy. "137
There are several arguments supporting the view that there
should not be regulation in the form of licensing schemes at all.
Licensing schemes, such as the one in Littleton, force a court to
render a prompt judicial decision, and thus, introduce issues impli-
cating the separation of powers doctrine.1 38 A city cannot guaran-
tee a prompt decision from the judiciary because they cannot tell a
state or federal judge when they must rule.13 9 Furthermore, sup-
porters of non-regulation argue adult business ordinances are just a
136. See id. (discussing why Z.J Gifts has important First Amendment implica-
tions). According to Hilden, the only way an adult business may be given less than
the full First Amendment protection is for someone to make that decision. See id.
For that conclusion to be made, the decision-maker must have made an ethical
judgment that adult businesses are not entitled to the full protection of the First
Amendment. See id. This is where the true trouble lies because the First Amend-
ment is not limited in application only to areas the decision-maker deems are wor-
thy. See id. (summing up essential constitutional issues of case).
137. Id.; see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1964) (as-
serting that constitutional protections do not depend on whether view is popular,
or even true, because fundamental principle is that debate remain open and unin-
hibited); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1957) (Douglas, J.,
Black, J., dissenting) (discussing nature of free speech). In his dissent, written in
1957, prior to Freedman, Justice Douglas recognized the importance of a prompt
hearing and ruling on the issue of obscenity. See Kingsley Books, 354 U.S. at 446.
People have the right to defend their speech on the merits. See id. Not doing so
leads to the "power to restrain publication before even a hearing is held. This is
prior restraint and censorship at its worst." Id. Furthermore, Justice Douglas
argued:
One is entitled to defend every utterance on its merits and not to suffer
today for what he uttered yesterday. Free speech is not to be regulated
like diseased cattle and impure butter. The audience (in this case the
judge or the jury) that hissed yesterday may applaud today, even for the
same performance.
Id. at 447 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Hilden, supra note 3 (comparing treat-
ment of adult businesses to other First Amendment protected businesses). Hilden
argues Z.J Gifts tests the extent that adult businesses will be treated like other First
Amendment protected commercial entities. See Hilden, supra note 3. She con-
cludes if adult businesses are not given the same full protection that the other
protected businesses receive, then speech will become "a little less free." Id.
138. See Enforcing Morality, supra note 17, at 14 (quoting Scott Bergthold who
claims "requiring a prompt judicial decision would violate separation of powers").
Mr. Bergthold is a lawyer and expert on adult businesses; he also filed an amicus
brief for the International Municipal Lawyer's Association supporting Littleton.
See id. (providing biographical information on Mr. Bergthold).
139. See id. (quoting Bergthold who states cities cannot guarantee promptju-
dicial decisions because city councils cannot tell state or federal judges when to
rule in case).
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method for religious organizations to try and enforce morality on
society. 140
Although Z.J Gifts established that a promptjudicial decision is
required, it did not give criteria as to what would qualify as prompt.
Some point out that this lack of guidance may result in excessive
litigation.14 One solution to this problem would be to write spe-
cific timelines into the ordinance itself, which may present a new
set of issues. Critics do not believe adult businesses' rights are so
threatened that it warrants them to jump ahead in dockets to be
decided before other, equally important cases. 142 Alternatively, if
the First Amendment issue is legitimately severe enough, courts
should hear it instead of having the mandate written into law.
143
While there is criticism of ZJ. Gifts, ZJ still received First
Amendment protection and the risk of censorship was reduced by
decreasing the amount of discretion the government has in regulat-
ing adult businesses. 144 There are two parts to the decision: first,
140. See id. (quoting First Amendment expert and Florida attorney, Lawrence
Walters, who often represents adult businesses, that "'[t]he religious right has
made an issue of trying to enforce morality in our society'"). Religious groups
argue the Supreme Court has taken adult business zoning cases because they are
important to society. See id. Paul J. McGeady, General Counsel for the conserva-
tive group Morality in Media, whose function is to monitor obscenity issues, claims
that "'the lives of and souls of our children and our nonconsenting adults [are] at
heart in these matters."' Id.; see also Sotos, supra note 54, at 6 (discussing how
zoning is not method used to impose morality). Sotos also claimed that:
As a practical matter, local politicians often react to community outrage
over such establishments by strictly applying zoning laws and building
codes as a means of forcing the businesses out of town. When this occurs,
federal courts must be careful to ensure that such measures are not mere
vehicles for imposing morality.
Sotos, supra note 54, at 6.
141. See Slants, supra note 89, at 89 (stating decision will most likely lead to
more litigation). The result of this ruling is that adult business owners will chal-
lenge review ordinances on a case-by-case applied basis. See id.
142. See Phone Business, supra note 54, at C6 (discussing importance of adult
businesses in First Amendment context). This article quotesJustice Scalia who was
skeptical of the importance of adult businesses in the First Amendment realm.
Justice Scalia stated:
Somehow adult bookstores are so significant to the life of the community
because of the First Amendment that they have to get special treatment
.... I have to wait two years before I can put in my bedroom, but the
adult bookstores go to the front of the line. That seems strange and if
that is where we've arrived, maybe we need to retrace our steps.
Id.
143. See id. (stating "without prompt review the ordinance could be 'a subter-
fuge of censorship'").
144. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 227 (1990) (recognizing
unbridled discretion of licensor "creates the risk of indefinitely suppressing per-
missible speech"); see also 11126 Balt. Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's County,
Md., 58 F.3d 988, 994 (4th Cir. 1995) ("' [T]hat in the area of free expression a
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that ZJ was not entitled to an especially speedy judicial decision that
Freedman provides, and second, that Colorado's ordinary judicial
rules were sufficient to fulfill the requirement. 145 According to its
own precedent, adult businesses are entitled to less constitutional
protections than other forms of protected speech. 146 The Court
gave ZJ First Amendment protection, but conceded that it was less
than what other forms of protected expression would receive. 147
This would be consistent with the precedent set in previous Su-
preme Court cases dealing with the First Amendment protection of
adult businesses.' 48
V. IMPACT
Now that the Supreme Court has resolved the dispute and de-
cided that licensing schemes regulating adult business require
prompt judicial decisions, the practical effects of this decision re-
main to be seen. Some argue that the decision will impact all cities
in this country, while others maintain its effect will remain limited
to Littleton, Colorado.1 49 Part of the uncertainty results from the
fact that the Court did not issue a clear rule on how lower courts
must meet the requirements of Freedman.'50
licensing statute placing unbridled discretion in the hands of a government official
or agency constitutes a prior restraint and may result in censorship."') (quoting
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988)).
145. See City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 124 S. Ct. 2219, 2226 (2004)
(holding ZJ is not entitled to especially fast judicial decision like Freedman and
Colorado's rules are flexile enough so judges may come to rulings promptly in
ordinary cases while using judicial power to stop substantial First Amendment
harms).
146. SeeYoung v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (holding
erotic, nonobscene materials are protected by First Amendment, but get less pro-
tection than other protected forms of expression).
147. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2226 (stating Z.J. is not entitled to heightened
protection because ordinance does not seek to censor content); see also Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 60 (1965) (determining how procedural safeguards are
applied is for state to decide). Freedman, decided in 1965, nearly forty years before
Z.J Gifts, stated "[h]ow or whether Maryland is to incorporate the required proce-
dural safeguards in the statutory scheme is, of course, for the State to decide." Id.
148. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 584 (1991) (holding that
society's interest in protecting expression of adult businesses is different "and
lesser, [in] magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate") (citing
Young, 426 U.S. at 70); see also Young, 427 U.S. at 70 (giving sexually based material
less constitutional protection than that concerning "untrammeled political
debate").
149. For a brief discussion of predictions on the impact of the case, see supra
note 89 and accompanying text.
150. See Netherby, supra note 89, at 8 (claiming Court did not issue clear rule
on how requirement must be met, so it is unclear what impact this decision will
have).
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One main effect most experts seem to expect is an increase in
litigation. Part of this trend will be due to adult businesses that now
need to challenge ordinances on an "as applied" basis.1 51 Another
area of expected increased litigation will be devoted to flushing out
the meaning of the decision and discovering its outer
boundaries. 152
Prima facie, Z.J Gifts seems to be in favor of adult businesses by
requiring a stricter standard of review in adult business licensing
schemes. 153 Some skeptics argue, however, that it does not suffi-
ciently protect adult business owners because it gives courts too
much discretion.1 54 Courts will have the power to decide what type
of protection to apply, which will likely result in inconsistencies de-
pending on the particular licensing scheme and what it seeks to
regulate. 155 The opening of adult businesses, and pornography in
general, often invoke strong opposition from cities and its re-
sidents. Therefore, delays will result from adult businesses who ap-
peal the denial of a license and, although the delays suppress
constitutionally protected expression, they will be found
acceptable. 156
First Amendment supporters fear this decision may be just an-
other in a long list of constitutional protections that have been
151. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2224 (holding that whether state courts meet
requirement of being sensitive to potential First Amendment harms should be
made on case-by-case basis); see also Slants, supra note 89, at 89 (recognizing in-
creased litigation from Court's holding that ordinances need to be challenged on
as applied basis, and stating everyone has to wait and see whether prompt review
will remain norm).
152. See Little Cheer, supra note 88 (predicting new round of litigation to find
out what decision meant as applied to efforts by local governments to hamper
adult businesses).
153. See id. (discussing that at first glance, this decision may seem to be victory
for adult bookstore owners).
154. See id. (laying out criticisms of Court's rulings). Skeptics of the decision
include Cincinnati lawyer H. Louis Sirkin, who filed a brief on behalf of the First
Amendment Lawyers Association, and New York lawyer for the American Booksell-
ers Association Michael Bamberger, who also filed a brief in the case. See id.
Neither lawyer is happy with this decision because, despite requiring prompt judi-
cial decisions, it gives "little ammunition to challenge lower courts' handling of
appeals by adult-business owners." Id.
155. See id. (indicating what power courts have after Z.J Gifts). Under this
decision, courts will only be required to treat appeals "from adult businesses no
worse than other types of suits." Id. Attorneys Bamberger and Sirkin "fear, any
kind of slow handling of their cases will suffice." Id.
156. See id. (stating adult business cases could be on appeal for months and
that might be found acceptable). Mauro claims the "trust the courts" to do what is
required of them attitude is unwarranted because it is unrealistic to just assume
that courts will always do what they are supposed to do. See id.
20051
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taken away from the public. 157 The Court does not have to overrule
its precedent, that pornography and adult businesses are constitu-
tionally protected, because this decision will have the same effect in
practice. 158 Finding the ordinary judicial rules of a state adequate
enables local governments to ensure constitutional protection with-
out adding any special safeguards in the ordinance.1 59 Potential
suppression of a supposed protected industry may result because
adult businesses will not receive the same full protection as other
First Amendment protected business.1 60 Limiting the protection in
this way is an example of the gradual, but continual, deterioration
of the application of the First Amendment.161
Many cities and their residents do not disguise their disdain for
the adult business industry.16 2 Pursuant to this decision, state
courts have seized the opportunity to find their state judicial rules
sufficient to prevent First Amendment harms. 163 There are two
157. See Collins, supra note 13 (stating Court's record is typically mixed re-garding First Amendment issues, but has recently become hostile towards FirstAmendment claims concerning speech, press, petition, and assembly). Collins liststhis case as one of only three freedom of expression opinions this past term. See id.Furthermore, the Court has denied almost every free speech claim it has agreed tohear since the 2002-03 term. See id. In effect, this means the Court is giving fewerfreedom of expression opinions and denying more of the First Amendment claims
than it hears. See id.
158. See Grogan, supra note 88 (quoting Chris Finan, president of AmericanBooksellers Foundation for Free Expression, who filed amicus brief on behalf ofZJ, that decision is disappointing). Opponents of the decision claim not establish-ing a set time frame for licensing schemes to ensure constitutionality leaves thedecision to the discretion of the courts. See id. The impact on free speech is that
adult businesses face the choice between closing and being prevented from open-
ing. See id.
159. See City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 124 S. Ct. 2219, 2226 (2004)(stating ordinary court rules in Colorado and other states are adequate to "give
reviewing courts judicial tools sufficient to avoid delay-related First Amendmentharm"). Furthermore, the city is not required to place the judicial review safe-guards in the licensing scheme ordinance because how the state chooses to incor-
porate safeguards is for the state to decide. See id.
160. See Hilden, supra note 3 (stating unless nonobscene, sexually oriented
speech receives full First Amendment protections, to which it is entitled, speech
becomes less free).
161. See Mauro, supra note 43 (discussing gradual but undeniable decline in
attention Supreme Court gives to First Amendment).
162. See Hudson, supra note 54 (explaining how cities use secondary effectsdoctrine as method to "conceal their thinly disguised dislike for adult entertain-
ment behind claims of harmful effects"); see also Maimon, supra note 18, at Al(discussing response from community of Knox County, Kentucky, who describe
adult business as "trash and filth", "a major invasion on the community", not familyfriendly, and that it would not be accepted in community).
163. See Dream Palace v. County of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir.2004) (recognizing precedent set in Baby Tam & Co., Inc. v. City of Las Vegas, 154F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 1998) is no longer good law and that Z.J. Gifts now provides
adequate framework for analyzing judicial review provisions of ordinances). In
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possible results once cities establish ordinary state judicial rules as
the constitutional timeframe. First, fewer applications will be ac-
cepted so there will be a decline in the amount of adult busi-
nesses.1 64 Second, since decisions are only entitled to the speed
ordinary court rules provide, appeals of denied licenses may result
in lengthy court delays.1 65 During this delay the business must be
closed. 16 6 Both of these result in near censorship in the form of
protected expression being unheard.
167
The First Amendment has become an integral part of Ameri-
can society, forming the underlying basis for a successful democ-
racy. 1 68 The power of free speech is not only in democracy, but in
the idea that it is "a value intimately intertwined with human auton-
omy and dignity."1 69 The significance of this decision may not be
limited to its impact on the adult business industry.' 70 Its real sig-
nificance may be in its practical consequence on future society re-
Dream Palace, pursuant to Z.J Gifts, the Ninth Circuit found Arizona's rules of pro-
cedure were sufficient to prevent significant First Amendment harms. See id. at
1004; see also Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 333 F. Supp. 2d 773, 780
(S.D. Ind. 2004) (upholding city ordinance and stating Z.J Gifts "paved the way for
our conclusion").
164. See Loses Ruling, supra note 89, at B5 (indicating decision could spell clos-
ing for Z.J Gifts).
165. See Little Cheer, supra note 88 (explaining courts may treat appeals from
adult businesses same as any other business even though it implicates First Amend-
ment, and therefore, they may wait for ruling on appeal for months).
166. See Loses Ruling, supra note 89, at B5 (stating because business is shut
down during appeal, delays result in prior restraint); see also Hilden, supra note 3
(explaining judicial decisions that are left unresolved for too long result in
messages unheard until decision is made and those chilling effects causing irre-
trievable losses).
167. See Brief of Amicus Curiae First Amendment Lawyers Association at 13,
City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D4, L.L.C., 124 S. Ct. 2219 (2004) (No. 02-1609)
("Absent a Guarantee that ajudicial Decision Will be Promptly Reached, Licensing
Schemes that Target Protected Expression May Be Used as Subterfuge for
Censorship.").
168. For discussion of the importance of the First Amendment, see supra note
43; see also Smolla, supra note 11 (quoting Justice Brandeis discussing importance
of free speech to democracy that "'freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth'").
169. See Smolla, supra note 11 (explaining freedom of speech is not just im-
portant because helps democracy but also because of its value on individual and
personal level). Smolla elaborates on this idea by stating:
Freedom of speech is thus bonded in special and unique ways to the
human capacity to think, imagine, and create. Conscience and con-
sciousness are the sacred precincts of mind and soul. Freedom of speech
is intimately linked to freedom of thought, to that central capacity to rea-
son and wonder, hope and believe, that largely defines our humanity.
Id.
170. For a further discussion of the impact on the adult business industry, see
supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
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suiting from the anticipated degradation of the First
Amendment. 171
While this decision has generated a significant amount of at-
tention, it may be too soon to determine its true impact. 172 The
thrust of the holding is that adult businesses are entitled to First
Amendment protection, although limited, which is what they had
received prior to the decision. 173 It has already been established
that cities may not completely prohibit adult businesses from oper-
ating within city limits. 174 Therefore, if cities begin to use the deci-
sion as an excuse to zone the adult business industry out, it will
result in censorship and violate this principle. 175 This is not the
intended result, however, because adult businesses are constitution-
ally protected. 7 6 It seems rather unlikely to become an issue and if
it does, state courts will be able to adequately remedy the problem
through "prompt judicial decision" on appeal to enforce the
proper First Amendment protection.177
Karen Cynn
171. See Gerth, supra note 59, at BI (quoting adult business attorney, FrankMascagni, who indicates his biggest concern is "the tone it [ZJ. Gifts] sets - not theimmediate impact" on his current case); see also Little Cheer, supra note 88 (quoting
First Amendment attorney, Michael Bamberger, who filed amicus brief in case onbehalf of American Booksellers Association, who claims decision is "at least a half-
step backwards" and not victory because of First Amendment impact).
172. For a full discussion of various organizations who have expressed interest
in decision, see supra notes 86, 88 and accompanying text.
173. See City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 124 S. Ct. 2219, 2226 (2004)(stating adult business ordinances that do not seek to censor content are not enti-tled to especially speedy judicial decisions). Even before Z.J Gifts was decided,
state courts were aware that adult businesses were entitled to First Amendmentprotection and it should be less than other speech cases; this was established al-
most thirty years ago. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71
(1976).
174. For full discussion of limits to city prohibitions on adult businesses, see
supra note 52 and accompanying text.
175. It is established that a city cannot completely zone an industry out of
operation because it results in censorship. For a further discussion, see supra note
53 and accompanying text.
176. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2221 (recognizing ordinances must meet FirstAmendment requirement of some sort ofjudicial review). For discussion of consti-tutional protections under the First Amendment, see supra notes 43-44 and accom-
panying text.
177. See Z.J Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2224-25 (stating ordinary court procedural
rules give reviewing courts adequate tools to avoid delay and there is no reason todoubt willingness of courts to want to avoid threat of delay). For further discus-
sion, see supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
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